It fills injections for other drug companies, and it is one of the few places in the world trusted to do it sterile. Gland Pharma makes injectable medicines — vials, ampoules, ready-to-use infusion bags — almost entirely for other companies to sell under their own labels. In the June 2026 quarter it turned over ₹1,800 crore, up 20%, with the United States at 54% of revenue and Europe 22%. The full year to March 2026: revenue ₹6,431 crore, up 14.5%, and profit ₹1,027 crore, up 47%. EBITDA margin rose from 22.6% to 25.3%. Is it good at it? The regulatory record is the answer. Gland has 389 abbreviated new drug applications filed in the United States, of which 342 are approved — a cumulative position that takes decades to build and cannot be bought. Sterile injectable manufacturing is difficult enough that a rival's own management, at Neuland Laboratories, described Gland as "one of the key players when it comes to this specific kind of sterile manufacturing, which is not very prevalent, not just in India, but across the globe."
On the measure that matters in generic injectables — how many products you are allowed to sell — it keeps adding to a very large number. The currency of this business is regulatory approvals, because each one is a licence to compete on a molecule. Gland has 389 abbreviated new drug applications filed in the United States with 342 approved and 47 pending; three were filed and seven approved in the June quarter alone, alongside four launches. Beyond the base portfolio, fifteen products are in co-development with partners — seven of them 505(b)(2) filings, which are harder and better protected — with commercialisation expected from FY28. In ready-to-use infusion bags, 21 products are filed, 18 approved and 11 in development, against a United States market the company sizes at $644 million. Research spending was ₹77 crore in the quarter, 4% of revenue, aimed at complex products rather than volume. What is not disclosed is plant utilisation, which for a manufacturer selling capacity is the number a reader would most like to see.
There is effectively none, and the problem is the opposite one. Borrowings at March 2026 were trivial against a balance sheet holding ₹3,359 crore of cash — debt-to-equity of 0.03, and net cash of ₹3,076 crore. That cash is about 7% of what the whole company is worth on the market. Operating cash flow was ₹1,031 crore for the year, and over three years cash has run at 1.18 times reported profit. The pile is being added to, not drawn down. No debt means no constraint and no risk of one. It also means a large part of the balance sheet earns a deposit rate while the shareholders' return is measured against all of it — which is why return on equity of 9.9% sits so far below return on capital of 14.9%.
Growing steadily, and profit is growing three times faster than sales. Year to March 2026: revenue ₹6,431 crore, up 14.5%. Profit ₹1,027 crore, up 47%. EBITDA margin 25.3% against 22.6%; net margin 16.0%. The gap between 14.5% and 47% is operating leverage plus a low base — FY25 was a weak year, and profit has compounded at only 9.6% over three years against revenue at 21%. The June 2026 quarter carried the same shape: revenue ₹1,800 crore up 20%, adjusted EBITDA margin 28% against 25%, profit ₹317 crore up 47%. Management has guided to around 20% growth over the next four years on the strength of newly signed contracts, while being careful about the current year — "probably 15%" in constant currency, and explicitly still estimating.
Sales up 14.5%, profit up 47%, and the three-year record is weaker than either. Year to March 2026: revenue ₹6,431 crore against ₹5,617 crore. Profit ₹1,027 crore against ₹699 crore. Earnings per share of ₹62.34. Over three years revenue has compounded at 21% — but profit at only 9.6%, because the years in between were poor. FY26 is a recovery to a level the company had reached before, not a new plateau. June 2026 quarter: revenue ₹1,800 crore, up 20% year on year and 3% on the March quarter. Profit ₹317 crore, up 47%.
Its own plants for capacity, other people's pipelines for growth — and it bought a European business that is still being fixed. Gross block grew 8.3% in the year, a modest figure for this company, with capital spending directed at brownfield and greenfield expansion across the manufacturing network. The growth that matters is contractual rather than physical. Three agreements were announced around the June quarter: a CDMO partnership with a global pharmaceutical company worth $90–100 million a year once all products are commercialised, with revenue from calendar 2029; the strategic collaboration with Neuland Laboratories, covered on this site, to manufacture sterile active ingredients for microparticle depot products; and an in-licensing agreement with a China-based developer for a niche liposomal product, with revenue expected around FY30. The one acquisition on the books is Cenexi, the French manufacturer, and it is the unfinished business — €48 million of revenue in the quarter on €2 million of EBITDA. Management is holding to guidance of about €200 million of revenue and high single-digit margins for the full year.
Widening, and the June quarter widened them further. EBITDA margin for the year to March 2026 was 25.3% against 22.6%. Net margin 16.0%. Gross margin held at 65%, so the gain came below the materials line — better utilisation and cost control rather than better pricing. The June 2026 quarter: adjusted EBITDA margin of 28% against 25% a year earlier, on gross margin unchanged at 65%. Management attributed it to product mix, higher volumes from existing products and improved capacity utilisation. The drag is European. Cenexi turned €48 million of revenue into €2 million of EBITDA in the quarter — around 4% — against a group earning 28%. Every point of margin recovery there is worth more than a point gained in India.
Improving, but held down by the cash it refuses to spend. Return on capital employed was 14.9% for the year to March 2026, up from 11.9%. Return on equity 9.9%. That gap is the whole story of this balance sheet. Equity funds ₹3,359 crore of cash earning a deposit rate, so the shareholders' return is dragged below what the operating business actually earns. Strip the cash out and the underlying business is a good deal better than 9.9% suggests. Neither figure is where this company has been in better years, and the recovery from 11.9% is one year old. The three announced contracts do not contribute revenue until 2029 and beyond, so the capital deployed against them sits in the denominator for years before it earns anything.
Cash comes in ahead of profit, and always has. Collections are the slow part. Operating cash flow over three years ran at 1.18 times reported profit — ₹1,031 crore in the year to March 2026 alone. Cash is not a question at this company. Debtor days are 107, which is long, and it is structural rather than a lapse: Gland sells to large pharmaceutical companies and hospital distributors in the United States and Europe, who pay on their own terms. It is the price of that customer list. Inventory and receivables both grew with the business rather than ahead of it.
A Chinese pharmaceutical group owns half of it, the chief executive's chair is empty, and the board is built to make the first fact comfortable. Gland was founded in Hyderabad in 1978 and listed in 2020. It is controlled by Fosun Pharma, which holds 51.77% through five entities — Fosun Pharma Industrial, Fosun Industrial, Ample Up, Lustrous Star and Regal Gesture. This is not a founder-run company; it is a subsidiary of a listed Chinese group. Srinivas Sadu is executive chairman, with 27 years in the industry and the leadership record for the 2020 listing. Ravi Shekhar Mitra is chief financial officer. Dr. Jia Ai Zhang sits as a non-executive director for the parent. The gap worth knowing about: Shyamakant Giri resigned as chief executive officer with effect from 30 April 2026, and the annual report states a successor will be appointed "at the earliest possible". The company is running with an executive chairman and no chief executive. The board is eight — one executive, three non-executive, four independent. Naina Lal Kidwai, who retired as chairman of HSBC India in 2015, and Udo Johannes Vetter are among the independents. Deloitte Haskins & Sells LLP issued an unmodified opinion on FY26. Four independents against three parent-nominated directors is a reasonable balance where one shareholder holds a majority. It does not change the fact that the majority exists, or that the executive bench is currently one person short.
Small and shrinking in India. Unquantified in Belgium. Contingent liabilities at March 2026: claims against the company not acknowledged as debts of ₹6.81 crore — down sharply from ₹118.94 crore a year earlier — plus ₹21.33 crore of direct tax demands and a set of indirect tax demands covering entry tax, service tax, value added tax and goods and services tax. Against ₹1,027 crore of profit, none of it signifies, and the fall in the main claim line is the year's good news. Deloitte recorded an unmodified opinion. The one open matter that cannot be sized: Cenexi Laboratories Thissen, the Belgian step-down subsidiary, is in dispute with a partner over alleged breaches of cooperation agreements signed in 2016 and 2021. Both sides have made claims and counterclaims, and the company states the amounts are unsubstantiated and that it cannot reliably estimate the outcome. It is disclosed and it is genuinely open.
Very few companies anywhere can fill a sterile injection to American standards. Gland is one, and its rivals are becoming its customers. The business is contract manufacturing of injectables — a licence-and-plant business where the barrier is regulatory rather than chemical. 342 approved United States applications and a plant record clean enough to keep them is the moat. What distinguishes Gland from the other contract manufacturers covered here is where it sits in the chain. Divi's Laboratories, Laurus Labs, Neuland and Sai Life make the molecule; Gland makes the finished sterile dose. That is why the Neuland collaboration announced this quarter is a partnership rather than a fight — as Neuland's management put it, "we don't compete with each other." The second difference is ownership. Fosun Pharma's majority stake gives Gland a route into Chinese development pipelines — this quarter's in-licensing of a liposomal product from a China-based developer is an example — that none of its Indian peers has.
Its competitors are the world's large generic injectable makers. Its closest Indian peers are, increasingly, partners. In sterile injectables Gland competes with the global generic injectable businesses for the same molecules in the same American tenders — a small group, because the barrier is a regulatory record rather than chemistry. Gland does not name them in its filings, and this page will not invent a list. Among the companies covered on this site, the relationship is more complementary than competitive. Divi's Laboratories at ₹10,560 crore of annual revenue, Laurus Labs at ₹6,813 crore, Neuland at ₹2,023 crore and Sai Life at ₹2,192 crore all make active ingredients; Gland, at ₹6,431 crore, turns ingredients into finished injections. The June 2026 quarter made that explicit, with Gland and Neuland announcing a long-term collaboration to manufacture sterile active ingredients for microparticle depot products — Neuland's chemistry, Gland's sterile capability. Where Gland does meet them is contract development for global innovators, and there it is the smaller player in a crowded field.
Helping: three signed contracts and a recovering European plant. Hurting: almost none of the new revenue arrives before 2029. Helping. The June quarter brought a CDMO partnership with a global pharmaceutical company worth $90–100 million a year at full commercialisation; the Neuland collaboration on sterile active ingredients; and an in-licensing deal with a China-based developer for a liposomal product. Base business is doing its part too — four launches, seven approvals and three filings in the quarter, and capacity utilisation improving. Hurting, or at least testing patience: the technology transfer on the largest contract takes two years and revenue starts in calendar 2029. The China-licensed product is a 2030 story. Fifteen co-developed products begin commercialising in FY28. Management put it plainly when asked about growth beyond the current contracts — they are re-evaluating, and expect more clarity next quarter. And the live operational problem is Cenexi. €48 million of revenue at €2 million of EBITDA in the quarter, with a summer heat wave in Europe delaying quality releases at Fontenay. Guidance of roughly €200 million and high single-digit margins for FY27 is being maintained, which requires the rest of the year to be considerably better than the first quarter of it.
A long-term grower with a permanent price problem. Generic injectables grow with volume — ageing populations, more procedures, more hospital administration of drugs — and the shift of manufacturing away from China gives Indian suppliers a structural tailwind. Sterile capacity is genuinely scarce, and shortages of injectable drugs in the United States have been chronic for a decade. Against that, prices in generics fall every year by design. The business only works if volume and new approvals outrun the erosion, which is why the count of filings matters more than any single product. The industry does not boom and bust so much as grind. What changes a company's position within it is a plant failing an inspection, or a shortage handing whoever is approved a year of pricing power.
The cheapest contract manufacturer covered here, on earnings that have only just recovered. At ₹2,910.20 on 17 August 2026 the company is worth ₹47,960 crore — 46.7 times the year to March 2026 earnings, 4.6 times book, 7.5 times sales. That is the lowest multiple of any contract manufacturer on this site, against Syngene at 51.3, Neuland at 83.2, Divi's at 87.7 and Laurus at 109.9. Two things pull in opposite directions. Net cash of ₹3,076 crore is about 6% of the market value, so the operating business is being valued at rather less than the headline. But the earnings in the denominator are a recovery year, and profit has compounded at under 10% over three years. The case for paying it rests on contracts that produce revenue from 2029, and on Cenexi getting fixed. Neither is visible in this year's figures.
Expensive in absolute terms, and the cheapest of its peers here. On 17 August 2026 the share was ₹2,910.20 — 46.7 times earnings of ₹62.34 per share, 4.6 times book, and 7.5 times sales. The earnings yield is 2.1% and the dividend adds 0.7%. The stock trades 2.0% below its 52-week high of ₹2,970.20 and 82% above the low of ₹1,596.80, having risen 47.5% over the year. Against the contract manufacturers covered here it is the cheapest of the group: Syngene at 51.3 times, Neuland at 83.2, Anthem at 85.2, Sai Life at 86.0, Divi's at 87.7 and Laurus at 109.9. Some of that discount is the thin public float, some is three years of flat profits, and some is Cenexi.
Institutions have been quietly selling, in a year the share rose by half. Institutions held 39.18% at 30 June 2026, down 1.06 points over four quarters and down from 40.65% in the March quarter alone. Domestic institutions hold 30.44% and foreign institutions just 8.74%. That foreign figure is low for a company of this size and quality, and the reason is arithmetic rather than appetite: a 51.77% parent and a 9.05% public float leave very little to buy. The free float is the constraint. Selling into a 47% rise is what large domestic funds do when a position has worked and the float is thin.
Most of India's large fund houses, and Norway. Above 1% at 30 June 2026: HDFC Mid-Cap Fund, Mirae Asset Large & Midcap Fund, Nippon India Growth Mid Cap Fund, SBI Large & Midcap Fund, ICICI Prudential India Opportunities Fund, DSP Small Cap Fund, UTI Flexi Cap Fund, and Government Pension Fund Global — the Norwegian sovereign wealth fund. Two observations. The register is almost entirely domestic mutual funds, with the Norwegian fund the single foreign name of size — consistent with foreign institutional ownership of only 8.74%. And the funds holding it are mid-cap and small-cap mandates, which is where a company of ₹47,960 crore with a 9% float ends up regardless of its actual size. No individual investor holds above 1%.
It pays a real dividend, issues nothing, and still cannot spend its cash fast enough. The dividend for the year to March 2026 was ₹20 per share — a payout of 32% of profit and a yield of about 0.7% at the current price. That is the highest payout ratio of any company covered on this site, and for a business generating ₹1,031 crore of operating cash it is affordable several times over. No shares were issued: dilution over the year was zero. No buyback. Which leaves the ₹3,359 crore question. The company holds cash equal to about 6% of its market value, pays out a third of profit, spends modestly on plant, and is now committing to contracts whose revenue starts in 2029. A buyback would flatter the returns that the cash currently drags down. Management has not proposed one.
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